

# EU Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR): A Look at Bosnia and Herzegovina

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EU-Presidency Seminar, 6 June 2007, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

## Introduction

*With the adoption of the EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), which was collectively developed by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission in December 2006, the EU officially identified DDR “as a key area for the European Union’s engagement in post-conflict peace building”. It laid the foundation for the EU’s future work in this area, as well as the basis to ensure a common understanding with potential partners.*

Over the years, the EU has supported a number of DDR processes in different parts of the world, especially through its community instruments. In September 2006, working within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU successfully completed its first DDR-Mission in Indonesia’s Aceh province.

Because of the variety of tasks and the eminently broad set of security-related, civil and military instruments at its disposal, the EU has a comparative advantage to other security actors; it is therefore on track to meet the challenges associated with DDR. Moreover, there already exists a high degree of civil and military competences at the EU-level, even though there remains an essential need for better coordination in the future. The new DDR concept aims at harmonizing the different European efforts concerning the field of DDR and should help to ensure a comprehensive approach from all EU-actors.

Nevertheless, even with the new joint EU-concept, there are still a lot of DDR-related

obscurities to be clarified at the conceptual, the methodological, and the practical levels. One of the most difficult questions, which have to be considered in this context, is the structural level of engagement to ensure a substantial success. On the one hand, DDR-concepts in general are largely focussing on ‘former combatants’ and are limited to a relatively short timeframe after the war period. On the other hand, the reintegration-process has to be seen as a long-term task and this requires the willingness of the EU as DDR-actor to stay the course.

### **DDR in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The actual experiences of the EU in matters of DDR are very limited, and practical knowledge is mostly based on experiences in Africa and Asia. As a result of this, the EU Concept for Support to DDR addresses the necessity of taking into account the experiences of other security actors as well. These are analysed equally with the objective of augmenting the EU’s competences and capabilities.

Within Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) seems to be the most prominent and far-ranging DDR-case from which the EU can draw important lessons, even if it was not a leading stakeholder in the local process. In fact, the manifold experiences of the international community – especially the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO – in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitute a very valuable foundation. This foundation could be of great use to the EU's further DDR engagement in other countries and regions. By taking these experiences into account, mistakes can be avoided and the focus can be turned to peace building essentials. Because of the fact that a reasonable time period has passed since first activities were undertaken in the post-Dayton phase, the long-term successes and failures of the work carried out so far are apparent. This is why BiH provides an excellent example for analysing the DDR process.

### **The EU-Expert Seminar**

In order to exchange different experiences and discuss recommendations on strengthening the EU's contribution to DDR and the enhancement of its policy as well as its practice, vis a vis the enormous challenges on the ground, the German EU-Presidency in co-operation with the Institute for European Politics (IEP) organised an expert seminar on, "EU Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR): A Look at Bosnia and Herzegovina".

With BiH as the focus, the key objective was to evaluate the situation in the country twelve years after the Dayton Peace Agreement. It highlighted the still existing challenges in the field of DDR with respect to, for example, the reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The seminar also discussed the

further role of the EU as an important actor in security and stability of BiH.

The one-day event was held on 6 June 2007 at the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. The event brought together more than seventy policy makers and specialists from EU member states, as well as BiH. The participants were associated with the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and European research institutes.

The seminar was split into three expert panels with different themes and was opened with a welcoming address by Eberhard Pohl, the Special Representative for Security Policy at the German MFA.

The first panel was devoted to the conceptual basis for the EU's DDR-approach and the relation between short term and long term activities in the field of DDR.

The second panel focused on the concrete situation in BiH and discussed the DDR goals which have already been accomplished. The second panel also aimed at evaluating past DDR-measures undertaken by the international community in BiH.

The third panel dealt with tangible recommendations for the further DDR-process in BiH, as well as options for developing an "integrated approach" for the active international organisations.

The three plenary sessions were followed up by closing remarks from Ulrich Brandenburg, Deputy Political Director at the German MFA, who also gave an outlook on the tasks ahead.

## Opening Statement by Eberhard Pohl

Germany's EU Presidency was mandated to continue the work on the ESDP support to security sector reform and 'DDR'. Given the importance of this issue, we were happy to take on this task and the Institute for European Politics (IEP), headed by Mathias Jopp, was charged with carrying out the appropriate studies and work. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the IEP team, which has done such fine work during the last few weeks. It was especially important that comprehensive evaluations were carried out on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brussels and Geilenkirchen. I am confident that this excellent groundwork has laid the foundation for stimulating debate and – we hope and indeed expect – productive results.

Last December, the EU Council and European Commission adopted the EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). This demonstrates our intention to focus even more in future on this issue, which was named a "key area for the European Union's engagement in post-conflict peace building".

The EU is by no means a novice in providing active support to DDR processes in selected countries. In particular, the EU Commission has a broad range of experience.

The need for action varies greatly according to the country concerned and the prevailing conditions. Thus, we need a tailored approach for each case, rather than a generalized DDR blueprint. The European Union has been supporting DDR processes worldwide for quite some time now, especially by way of Commission programmes (20 DDR processes in Africa since the early 1990s, as well as in Latin America and Asia). The most recent case was the ESDP operation AMM – Aceh



VLR I Eberhard Pohl, Special Representative for Security Policy, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Monitoring Mission – for which the mandate included the observation and monitoring of disarmament in Aceh.

Experience gained in different countries and mission areas can be useful and helps us improve the conceptual basis of our work. We therefore want to zoom in on this goal at today's event and look at the experiences of the international community from differing angles.

We made a conscious decision to focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina at today's event as part of our efforts to fulfil our ESDP Presidency mandate. We are convinced that Bosnia and Herzegovina provides an excellent example of a DDR process, as sufficient time has passed since the first activities undertaken in the post-Dayton phase. We feel it is also an excellent choice, the long-term successes and failures of the work done to date are apparent.

DDR-related activities are clearly more than just measures designed to last for the duration of the immediate post-conflict phase. DDR has to be seen within the context of a long-term dimension with follow-up. I would like to mention a few key points:

- the reintegration of former combatants must be structured according to a sustainable approach. This cannot be brought about by focusing on short-term results, such as simply placing individuals in temporary employment measures;
- individual and collective traumatising – both in the civilian population and among former combatants – often presents a serious hindrance to peaceful social development. This has to be taken into account in the context of reintegration efforts;
- Rebellious groups and political revisionists, particularly criminal gangs, have attracted frustrated veterans time and again. This is seen especially in areas recovering from civil war, and are used for their own ends;
- Finally, arms trafficking is flourishing in the hosts of former conflict regions. This is having a severe and direct impact on the development of security.

The sooner we manage to seriously tackle all of these difficult points, and are also to discuss sensitive DDR-related issues, the sooner our efforts will begin to bear lasting fruit.

The new EU concept on DDR provides us with a very good template. I am convinced that today's seminar, with its excellent speakers,

will make a valuable contribution towards heightening awareness of the importance and complexity of DDR and the importance of producing concrete results.

In addition to the points I have just mentioned, we should not forget the following aspects which are also crucial to success in crisis management in general, especially within the scope of DDR:

- genuine coherence between the first (Commission) and the second (CFSP/ESDP) EU pillars;
- effective interaction with international intergovernmental organizations (UN, OSCE, EU, NATO) and NGOs;
- observance of ownership on the ground;
- and the anchoring of DDR in the overall context of crisis prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peace building.

What matters is that we do not allow ourselves to be guided exclusively by the defined limits within the sphere of DDR. First and foremost, DDR concerns former combatants in a post-conflict situation. However, the diverse security activities have to be genuinely interlinked.

The EU's DDR concept therefore speaks explicitly to the connection of the importance of closely linking DDR to the overall reform process in the country concerned. This comprises the entire sphere of security sector reform, including defence reform, transitional justice, as well as efforts aimed at guaranteeing long-term political, social and economic stability.

*“DDR-activities are clearly more than just measures designed to last for the duration of the immediate post-conflict phase.”*

**Eberhard Pohl**



Hadewych Hazelzet, Inger Buxton, Mathias Jopp (Chair), Simon Yazgi, Charlotte Watson

## Session 1: DDR from a Conceptual Perspective – Between Post-Conflict Engagement and Long-Term Stability

*The first panel chaired by the Director of the Institute for European Politics, Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, specifically discussed the relation between short term and long term activities in the field of DDR and the need for a detailed conceptual template. Additionally, there was widespread consensus among the panellists that the EU should follow a holistic approach on DDR. Particularly, reintegration efforts should be conducted as an integrative part of a wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda, which unfortunately is often understood as consecutive to DDR-measures.*

### The UN and the EU Approach to DDR

Simon Yazgi, Policy & Planning Officer (DDR), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), New York

Simon Yazgi emphasized the significance of DDR programmes as integral components of the overall international effort to immediately stabilize a fragile post-conflict security situation. DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence, but can help establish a secure environment so that other elements of

a sustainable peace-building strategy can proceed. The ultimate aim of DDR programmes is to prevent a return to violent conflict, i.e. to make peace irreversible. In this context, the UN sees DDR as an early step in a series of peace-building processes to which the reform of the security sector, establishment of the rule of law, a functional economy, and workable political institutions are closely related.

Mr Yazgi pointed out that the EU, in its concept on DDR, has adopted the UN

definitions for DDR, with the difference being, that the latter includes reinsertion as an integral part in its concept. This term defines the second stage of demobilization and encompasses the 'support package' provided to the demobilized. It is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. As such, it is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of the ex-combatants and their families. While reintegration has a long-term, continuous social and economic goal for the process of development, reinsertion has short-term material and/or financial assistance goals, to meet immediate needs, and it can last up to one year.

Since DDR efforts require numerous skill sets and actors, as well as a certain amount of flexibility, no single entity is capable of undertaking all of a DDR process on its own. In this context, Simon Yazgi presented the UN approach outlined in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), which can be found online at the UN's DDR Resource Centre under <http://www.unddr.org>.

### **The EU-DDR-Concept: Learning from the Past**

Inger Buxton, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels

Inger Buxton underlined that the new EU Concept for DDR provided an important policy platform for the future EU engagement in this area. The aim of this concept has been to ensure more coherent EU support to DDR, as well as to become engaged in this area by taking a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding in post-conflict settings.

The majority of lessons learned come from Central America and Africa where most DDR processes have taken place. In these cases we

are often confronted with weak states or absence of functioning state structures. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the post-war development level is higher than most African examples. Yet, BiH faced its own challenges in terms of two post-war entities, three ethnic groups and post-communist transition through democratization and liberalization of the economy; factors which clearly impacted DDR.

While the international community was present and engaged, there seemed to be a lack of clear leadership in the area of DDR which made coordination more difficult. The provisions for DDR in the Dayton Peace Accords were also relatively weak. While there was agreement on the need for demobilization, the authorities in the entities were too weak to exercise effective leadership and lacked sufficient resources. What instead took place was a relatively rapid and disorganized demobilization process. No proper vetting or census was carried out to assess needs and there was no overall planning of the process.

The Dayton Accords gave limited guidance on SSR and how a holistic approach could be used for a future security system, including defence, justice, customs and border control and intelligence services. Clearer language on SSR in the agreement could have helped the DDR process. This was only later realized with the downsizing of the different forces that came in 1999-2000 and later on. The other weakness was the lack of provisions to address the problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). This could have ensured a more effective disarmament early on, after having signed the agreement. The spread of small arms has continued to hamper the peace process and has created insecurity through its links to organized crime.

The DDR efforts undertaken, mainly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

and World Bank programmes, generally lacked specific provisions for former women combatants, despite the significant number of women in the process. Today’s clearer understanding of the need to ensure that the needs of both former women and men combatants are met, could have helped in the BiH process. Another weakness was the lack of focus on trauma healing and the dealing with the psychological needs of former combatants, which has a long term impact on the development of the county. The reintegration aspect, generally being the weak link of any DDR process, was also hindered in the case of BiH due to the overall economical challenges faced by the country. Jobs created for former combatants tended to be short term rather than long-term, with an emphasis on reconstruction work. While special provisions can be taken, it is important also to offer job opportunities for other war-affected groups, and not be seen to favour former combatants. The World Bank programmes did include other groups outside the ex-combatants. Unemployment is still high among ex-combatants and the lack of employment and socio-economic development dampens the long-term prospects of full reintegration.

From a donor’s perspective, we still have a great deal to learn in terms of making general development co-operation and external assistance programmes sensitive to the needs of former combatants. Particularly in the case of health, education and financial sector programmes.

EU funding of DDR is mainly done through trust funds, humanitarian assistance and

assessed contributions for UN peace keeping. While trust funds many times have been criticized for being too cumbersome, they generally ensure partner country and donor coordination in the long-term. Through ESDP and the Instrument for Stability (IfS - formally RRM) the EU can also provide short term crisis management support in this area. Support for these instruments need to be followed by

long-term support under EC geographical instruments and member states bilateral support.

The new financial instruments of the EU, which came into effect in 2007, lack clear language on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This hampers the EC’s ability to ensure that short term

support is followed up with long-term support in areas such as DDR, small arms and other post-conflict measures. It is especially the case in post-conflict settings where we have left a crisis phase where IfS support would be applicable.

*“Future lessons learned should ideally include an independent assessment. Internal self-praise is no longer good enough.”*

**Hadewych Hazelzet**

**DDR: Supporting Security and Development – The EU’s Added Value**

Charlotte Watson, Senior Programme Officer, International Alert, Brussels

Charlotte Watson talked about the link between DDR and development work related to the role of the EU. In this context, she underlined that development agencies are often engaged prior to DDR and are committed to long term engagement afterwards. Meanwhile, DDR programmes are relatively short term oriented. Concerning the role of the EU in post-conflict peace-building, she emphasized its strong position to take a



holistic approach, as it is possible to engage a range of geographic and thematic programmes. Additionally, the EU is one of the biggest supporters of peace processes through both the 1st and 2nd pillars, and has a variety of budget lines for bilateral assistance as well as significant support to specific DDR programmes and UN Trust Funds at its disposal.

Ms Watson recommended that the maximum use of the EU's comparative advantage to pursue the goal of DDR should be made. Furthermore, she advocated the combination of a range of different instruments to optimise outcomes on stability and development. At the same time, however, a coherent and flexible approach must be ensured, in terms of programmes and goals within the EU institutions and with Member States and other organisations such as the UN and the World Bank.

#### **Human Rights and Gender Aspects of DDR: How to Implement EU Policy on the Ground?**

Hadewych Hazelzet, ESDP Department,  
German Foreign Office, Berlin

Hadewych Hazelzet provided an overview of the human rights and gender aspects of European Security and Defense Policy with regard to the EU's DDR policy. When planning the first EU mission "Operation Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of Congo in September 2003, questions relating to child protection, the role of women in peace and security, or transitional justice were not addressed. Today, all planned ESDP missions foresee human rights and gender advisors, as well as press officers to improve i.a. relations with women and other groups and communication with the local population. The EU has by now included the core notions of human rights, gender and – increasingly –

transitional justice in ESDP documents and mandates. Also, a handbook on mainstreaming human rights and gender into European Security and Defence Policy has been developed. But not much has been done to actually implement these policy ideals.

This is a good point to start closing the implementation gap. It actually pays off to pay attention to human rights, children, gender aspects and NGOs during crisis management operations, since this clearly adds to the success of the mission and facilitates the exit-strategy. All planned ESDP missions (Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC) will now include human rights and gender advisors as part of their staff to implement EU policies on the ground. These advisors could be more successful if they were backed by supporting capacity in Brussels. The new Civilian Operations Commander and the Chairman of the Military Committee and the Director General of the EU Military Staff should thus have a human rights and a gender advisor as part of their staff as well. Moreover, future missions should also consider adding experts in charge of relations with civil society and NGOs.

The German Presidency is advocating that Heads of Mission issue pocket cards for ESDP personnel. These pocket cards should cover issues of human rights, gender aspects, and children affected by armed conflict. In addition, all ESDP personnel should be trained in human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Finally, future lessons learned should ideally include an independent assessment, which includes adding local actors and international partners to the mission. Internal self-praise is no longer good enough.



Tobias Pietz, Emil Schreiber, Peter Croll (Chair), Lena Andersson, Massimo Moratti

## Session 2: DDR and Security in BiH: Lessons of the Past and Remaining Challenges

*The second panel, chaired by the Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Peter Croll, discussed the concrete situation “on the ground” in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the end of the civil war. It not only provided a detailed assessment of past DDR-activities of the international community, but it also highlighted remaining challenges in the field of security. Furthermore, all panellists pointed out a multitude of lessons which can be drawn from previous DDR-measures in BiH and could have an important impact on EU’s DDR-approach.*

### Arms Control in Accordance with the Dayton Agreement

OTL Emil Schreiber, Federal Armed Forces Verification Center (ZVBw), Geilenkirchen

Mr Schreiber gave an overview of the fundamentals of the Dayton Peace Accord, as well as some of its individual agreements concerning confidence and security building measures. Sub-regional and regional arms

control were also included. He paid special attention to measures in which Germany was involved, with regards to inspections, visits to weapons manufacturing facilities, and assistance in the reduction process.

He summed up the results of the arms control regime in accordance with the Dayton agreement by pointing to the reduction of heavy armaments and military personnel, the

transparency of the force structure, and the reunification of the entities inside BiH.

As follow-up measures, Mr Schreiber mentioned the reduction of small arms and light weapons, the “conversion” of military personnel and military facilities, the reduction of the military budget, and democratic control of the forces.

### **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Tobias Pietz, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Tobias Pietz presented an overview of the DDR measures in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. He began by describing the rapid disintegration of troops after the Dayton Peace Accords and the implications of the DPA for DDR with regard to the entity issue and the economic situation. Special emphasis was given to the two demobilisation and reintegration programmes of the World Bank.

The “Emergency Demobilization & Reintegration Project (EDRP)” of the World Bank got off to a late start. One project unit became operational in the FBiH in 1996 and the other project unit in the RS in 1997. While there was good cross-entity co-operation in sharing information, joint projects that might have addressed common problems were not pursued. Mostly short-term and labour intensive employment was offered for as long as international donors funded the reconstruction of the country. Generation of long-term self-employment was not a specific aim of the EDRP. Additionally, gender aspects and PTSD were not tackled in these programmes. By 1999 there were a total of 23,323 beneficiaries.

The follow-up programme of the EDRP was the “Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project (PELRP)”. At its start in the year 2000, there was only partial transfer of the EDRP memory and capacity to the PELRP. About 12,000 soldiers were discharged in 1999/2000, 8,000 of them were eligible and about 4,000 were beneficiaries of the programme. Too much time was spent to identifying beneficiaries and there was not enough cross-entity co-operation.

With regard to the lessons learned, it can be questioned whether or not a NATO and OHR-controlled DDR process was possible by 1995 and the years to come. The sustainability of structures and capacities has to be ensured, along with the transfer of institutional experiences in future DDR processes. A lack of entity co-operation must be avoided. Social issues, like domestic violence, gender aspects and PTSD must also be addressed. DDR and SSR measures should not be mixed into a too politicised situation. Long-term monitoring of success needs to be conducted.

### **RACVIAC’s Role in Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration**

Lena Andersson, Defence Conversion Expert, RACVIAC, Zagreb

Lena Andersson gave an overview of the aims and missions of the Regional Arms Control and Verification Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC). In this context, she mentioned confidence building, the enhancement of co-operation and the promotion of transparency with the purpose to support stability and security in the South-Eastern-European region. Thus, regional support networks should be developed and concentrate on the know-how of defence conversion issues. One obstacle to stability and security, pointed out by Ms Andersson, is the consumption level,

especially with regard to the defence expenditure. In the past the defence expenditure has been substantially larger than the budget – in 2002, the difference with regard to the Republika Srpska (RS) was 87 per cent and in the Federation 77 per cent. This poor financial management and control induce large accumulated arrears. Also, the personnel in Ministries of Defence and armed forces were not being paid regularly.

Defence expenditure reviews have drawn three main conclusions: First, defense budgets have been largely meaningless, and were no more than a starting point for consumption, rather than means of managing expenditure responsibly. Second, the accounts were maintained on a cash, not an accrued, basis. This means in practice that the only expenditure recorded against the budget are payments actually made in that financial year. Third, the lack of control coupled with inadequate oversight and failure to promptly correct known serious control issues, are indicative of a lax attitude towards control and a weak control environment.

In the second part of her speech, Ms Andersson presented the retraining and reintegration programmes funded by international donors and implemented by the IOM. Their aim is to ensure the smooth transition of former soldiers and to facilitate the defence reform. She elucidated the use of severance payments provided in the Armed Forces reduction in 2002 as follows: Over 22 per cent of the demobilized soldiers were females in the RS, compared to less than one per cent in the Federation. The average age of the demobilized soldiers was 35 years and 67

per cent had secondary education. Many did not have any work experience, and each had approximately four individuals who were dependents of him/her. Of the beneficiaries, a survey made by the Ministries of Defence

showed that 48 per cent invested their payments in business, 35 per cent in housing and economy facilities. Ms Andersson concluded that severance pay up front is an advantage if spent wisely and integrated into the resettlement programme activities. Furthermore, she stated that all major

stakeholders in the process should be involved, however, a point of focus needs to remain on the former soldiers. DDR should also be combined and connected with public administration reform.

*“Too much time was spent to identifying beneficiaries of demobilisation programmes and there was not enough cross-entity co-operation.”*

**Tobias Pietz**

### **The Missing Link between Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Transitional Justice: The Case of BiH**

Massimo Moratti, International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Brussels

Mr Moratti presented the findings of the ICTJ’s research project on DDR and transitional justice in BiH. He explained that transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that post-conflict societies apply to address legacies of serious human rights abuse. Since armed forces, police and other security actors frequently bear the greatest responsibility for past abuses, the reform of the security system (SSR), towards which DDR is considered a crucial first step, is critical to ensure that abuses are not repeated.

In BiH, demobilised soldiers reintegrated into the society are dominated by their own ethnic group, as whose defenders they are perceived

and therefore highly regarded. The ethnic division of BiH created a specific pattern of demobilization: although the conflict in BiH was largely internal, the particular challenges confronted in DDR and TJ programmes were akin to challenges encountered in inter-state conflicts. Ethnically based war veterans associations, having tens of thousands of members and branch offices in all municipalities, were allowed to acquire a significant political role in post-conflict BiH. As they oppose reforms, resist the return of refugees, and maintain a nationalist rhetoric, they generally act as spoilers of the transition. This in a way also applies to victims associations, which are also divided along ethnic lines. They tend to associate

themselves with war veterans associations of their own ethnic group rather than with other victims associations.

Mr Moratti criticised that DDR programmes remained separate from transitional justice initiatives and that IOM programmes were not designed in a way that would allow the data to be used for other purposes. Additionally, there was no consistent approach to transitional justice and several key areas were not addressed, for example, the political leadership was not subject to proper vetting. In general, the implementation of transitional justice measures depended on the initiative and perseverance of the international community and was partly dictated by external developments.



Adrian Wilkinson, Boris Ruge, Karsten Diethelm Geier (Chair), Christophe Deherre, Christian Haupt

## Session 3: EU Support for Security and Stability in BiH: Options and Policy Recommendations

*The third panel, chaired by Karsten Diethelm Geier from the Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union, discussed concrete options and policy recommendations not only concerning the further process in BiH, but also regarded the improvement of the conceptual basis of EU's DDR-approach. One important element in this context seems to be the wish for more consequent combination of DDR with certain measures in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and general political, economical, and social support activities.*

### Is there Room for Launching New European DDR Activities?

Col. Christophe Deherre, Civ/Mil Cell, EU-Military Staff (EUMS), Brussels

At the beginning of his speech, Col. Christophe Deherre reminded the auditory that the EU has not been in charge of any DDR programme in BiH. The EU has, however, contributed to every DDR initiative, either by funding elements of the programmes or by flanking developmental measures, which were necessary for the success of these DDR programmes.

The IC has been unable to disarm the communities, and BiH is facing a problem concerning the desired destruction of the huge existing amount of weapons, many of them illegally detained small arms. Dealing with this is very expensive, as well as technically complicated. This may be a long-term issue and there are no international partners who are able or willing to spend the amount of money needed. Since BiH has signed the code of conduct regarding arms trade and export, the IC will have to trust the country. BiH should, however, be monitored and

encouraged to deal with this issue, but reminded also to be patient.

Regarding the DDR-process, Mr Deherre stated that most of the ex-combatants have been demobilised. BiH needs a comprehensive review of its security sector but not a new DDR programme, especially concerning the citizens who are still active in the respective forces, in militias or in private security companies. There are, however, huge numbers of ex-combatants who have been disarmed and demobilised who are still unemployed. But no DDR programme can be launched for this, as this issue is largely

dependent on the economic situation in BiH, and in turn concerns the whole society. In the case of the SSR, the number of stakeholders is also complicating the situation.

Mr Deherre added that he is sceptical about whether or not there ever really was any proper DDR programme

in BiH. He emphasized that he does not present an agreed EU/ESDP point of view on this subject. Mr Deherre also pointed out that DDR is conceptually calling for local ownership. Further efforts are necessary to

*"EUSR should play a key role in helping ensure that BiH completes its passage to lasting stability, including by playing a role in SSR."*

**Boris Ruge**

improve the functioning of the judicial system, which is still not completely free from political interference, as well as concerning the overall police restructuring. Still, he stressed that the state of play, only five or ten years ago, must always be taken into account when assessing the current situation. In the field of coordination, there remains room for improvement by all the partners.

#### **BiH 2007: Supply the Security Needs**

Adrian Wilkinson, Head of the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), Belgrade

Adrian Wilkinson emphasised that, in effect, there is competition rather than co-operation in terms of project development in the field of DDR between different organisations in different countries. Although in Bosnia, the situation is better than in many other countries with close co-operation between OSCE and UNDP. Regrettably, and mainly due to the change over of the personnel every six months, co-operation and coordination with EUFOR is less effective.

The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and the European Union Force (EUFOR) both initiated Operation Harvest programmes to collect SALW. These are not yet part of a wider strategy, and are coordinated at battle group level, not at HQ EUFOR level. Therefore effectiveness is limited. The public information component of these programmes is still not in line with the UNDP's programme, and therefore the core messages have not necessarily been those of the wider national SALW Control Strategy.

The Draft Law on Weapons and Ammunition and the Draft Law on Testing, Stamping and Marking Hand Firearms and Ammunition in Bosnia are quite good, but the challenge of

implementation and coordination with entity level legislation remains.

The safety areas around many of the ammunition storage sites are inadequate for the large stocks of ammunition held there.

#### **General Remarks on Requirements for Effective DDR/SSR Missions and Suggested Areas for EU Assistance in BiH**

Christian Haupt, Head of the Security Co-operation Department's Parliamentary Section, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo

Christian Haupt presented findings based on ten years of continued field work in BiH. These findings dealt with further competent missions and effective expert missions and identified areas for possible EU assistance in BiH.

Mr Haupt stated that it is necessary to quickly deploy competent teams and not just individuals. These experts, at least some of them, should understand the local language and have a basic knowledge of the cultural, historical, and political background of the host country. Experts already working in the region should be included into the teams and it should be ensured that all experts serve on a long-term basis. Agencies working on DDR have to be coordinated with each other on the spot. This coordination has to be promoted by the organisations, although it ultimately depends on the willingness of their employees. There needs to be sufficient funding for operational activities including, for example, appropriate office space and office equipment.

Measures of DDR have to be seen in the context of SSR and along with the defence sector; similar projects need to be offered for police forces and intelligence services.

Mandates of EU military and police mission serving in one country should not be mixed in the overall process of SSR. Experiences from missions in other countries must be taken into account. Parliamentarians of the host country are to be included in the SSR and DDR efforts. Once the International Community leaves the country, domestic parliamentarians have to ensure the effective implementation of reform projects by the executive structures.

In BiH the EU could give assistance in the drafting of missing legislation on private military and security companies, weapons possession, movement of dangerous goods (incl. weapons and ammunition) and the collection of illegal weapons. Support is also needed during the implementation of the legislation, the institutional capacity building in the entire security sector of BiH and inter-governmental co-operation. Assistance should be given to deal with PTSD of former soldiers because International Organisations have not tackled that issue until today. The capacities and efforts, led by UNDP, for the destruction of surplus weapons and surplus/unsafe ammunition should be increased. Additional funding is therefore required. The transfer of property rights for moveable and immovable property of the Armed Forces of BiH and the conversion of obsolete military locations needs to be taken care of. Reform efforts in BiH and the whole region need to be supported and co-ordinated. Therefore, the Stability Pact successor RCC and RACVIAC should be supported.

**EU Support for Security and Stability in BiH:  
Options and Policy Recommendations: An  
EUSR Perspective**

Boris Ruge, Chief Advisor to the HR/EUSR BiH,  
Sarajevo

Boris Ruge stated that concerning the IC's policy towards BiH, there exists a mix between a time-driven approach and a benchmarks-driven approach. Even though the IC believes that after 12 years of a strong IC role it is time for local ownership and BiH has increasingly been equipped to undertake responsibility for the full spectrum of its security needs, the point where Bosnian authorities can manage the country without substantial international and EU backing has not yet been reached. Organized crime, corruption and porous borders remain major challenges. The fundamental question is whether BiH politicians will take the initiative to further develop institutional foundations. It is now more a question of will, rather than capacity. Yet the BiH authorities have often demonstrated a scant interest in driving such processes forward themselves.

Mr Ruge went on to say, that the planned closure of the Office of the High Representative in mid-2008 will push the EU to the centre of international responsibilities in Bosnia and necessitate follow-up arrangements with both IC and BiH partners.

All this means, that international agencies will have to continue to offer consistent and coordinated facilitation, advice and assistance. There will still be a need for EU police and military presence for several years to come. A strong EUSR, providing political guidance, could ensure coherence within the ESDP missions, as well as with the Commission and its other crucial international partners (like OSCE, UNDP and NATO). EUSR will not be the main IC actor on all SSR issues, but its contribution will be crucial in ensuring a coordinated and successful IC approach to SSR, as well as in guiding BiH on its way to full Euro-Atlantic integration.



# Closing Remarks by Ulrich Brandenburg

To sum up, I can say that the German EU-Presidency has accomplished the mission the preceding Finish Presidency had conveyed to it concerning the topic of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. By addressing matters of DDR particularly with reference to the specifics of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the groundwork already undertaken in this region could gainfully be used to discuss the subject on an empirical basis. Since similar questions exist in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the results of the debate also present starting points to analyze the setting and scope in the African country, e.g. with regard to the disarmament of militias.

In the context mentioned, three key elements should be emphasized: First, a coherent approach of the European Union is of immanent importance, as was rightfully pointed out by several of the speakers at our seminar. Second, as has also been underlined in our discussions, local ownership must be strengthened in a sustainable way in the long run. And last but not least, the coordination of the international actors remains an essential task not to be



*“The coordination of the international actors remains an essential task not to be underestimated in the future.”*

**Ulrich Brandenburg**

underestimated in the future. The following Presidencies of the Portuguese Republic and the Republic of Slovenia will certainly strive further to achieve these goals.

I would like to conclude by especially thanking the panel moderator of the Institute of European Politics, Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, as well as all of the participants of this very inspiring seminar.

## Suggestions on how to improve the EU's Engagement in DDR

*In the speeches, presentations, remarks and discussions which emerged during the conference, a number of recommendations and next steps for the EU have been articulated. The following summarizes the main remarks on the EU Concept for Support to DDR and highlight selected areas for future EU support to BiH.*

### Remarks on the EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

- The EU should strive for an early engagement by being involved at the earliest stages of peace or cease-fire negotiations and seek to implement a future DDR process into the peace treaty.
- The EU support should be carried out within a broad peace-building, recovery and development strategy. DDR processes have to, therefore, be seen in the context of SSR, although it should be avoided to mix up DDR and SSR processes in a highly politicised post-conflict situation. The target groups should be members of armed forces, militias, police forces and intelligence services. DDR processes, defence reforms and SSR processes should in general, from the beginning, be connected with public administration reforms. Parliamentarians of the respective country should also be included into DDR/SSR processes as early as possible.
- The EU should establish a pool of qualified experts due to be seconded abroad within the framework of specific DDR programmes. It is necessary to build up competent teams which can be deployed quickly; individuals are not sufficient. Experts, a significant number of them, should know the respective local language and be aware of the cultural, historical and political background of the respective host country. Experts already working in the respective region should be included in the team. These measures are also of great importance to ensure the conflict sensitive, i.e. tailored approach.
- To ensure respect for human rights and a gender perspective, human rights and gender advisors should be part of the staff for ESDP missions. In order to pay particular attention to co-operation with other actors, an expert should be in charge of relations with civil society and NGOs. These specialists have to be backed up by a supporting capacity from Brussels. To ensure a coherent approach, Heads of Missions should issue pocket cards for ESDP personnel. These pocket cards could cover issues like i.a. human rights, gender aspects and children affected by armed conflicts.
- Mine action should be part of DDR processes to promote broad peace-building strategies from the beginning.
- Reintegration programmes should be connected with the foundation of an agency in charge of transforming military competences into civilian qualifications as well as the provision of additional training and education for adequate civilian jobs

for soldiers in the last phase of their military service.

- UN definitions for DDR, which are the basis for the EU approach, include reinsertion as an integral part of demobilisation. The EU foresees giving support to ex-combatants, their dependents and receiving communities in the phases of reinsertion and reintegration. The EU may develop reinsertion mechanisms to give quick impact assistance including e.g. severance pays which have to be integrated into the resettlement programme activities.
- Impact assessments, monitoring and evaluation should systematically be built into DDR programmes and missions in order to enable an accurate assessment of their effectiveness. In addition, an independent evaluation, long-term monitoring of success and the transfer of experiences from missions in other countries will be necessary.

#### **Future Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- There is a Draft Law on Weapons and Ammunition and a Draft Law on Testing, Stamping and Marking Hand Firearms and Ammunition, but there also has to be the drafting of missing legislation on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC), movement of dangerous goods (including weapons and ammunition) and the collection of illegal weapons. This implementation of legislation and the coordination with entity level legislation will remain a challenge.
- There is a need to fight Organised Crime and corruption. In addition, borders are still porous. Therefore, capacity building and inter-governmental co-operation

have to be promoted in the entire security sector including the judiciary.

- The strategic goal of BiH's defense reform is the accession to Euro-Atlantic integration structures. NATO and MPRI are currently supporting the defense reform with a focus on the ministerial level. EUFOR could give training assistance to the Armed Forces BiH on the sub ministerial level in coordination with ongoing PfP measures.
- Property rights for movable and immovable property need to be transferred for the functioning of the Armed Forces BiH. Obsolete weapons and ammunition need to be destroyed, in addition to a conversion of obsolete military locations.
- A significant proportion of Bosnians possess firearms, many of which are unregistered. EUFOR initiated Operation Harvest programmes to collect SALW which are to be coordinated at HQ EUFOR level and not at battle group level. The public information components of these programmes should be coordinated with UNDP to enhance the effectiveness of the wider national SALW Control Strategy. Moreover, the change of military personnel every six months makes co-operation and coordination between OSCE/UNDP and EUFOR less effective.
- To make reconstruction and stabilisation in BiH and the whole region self-sustaining and irreversible, it is necessary to promote the reduction of SALW and ammunition of various calibres not only in BiH, but in Croatia and Serbia as well. Leaving the impression that Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs could be reinforced with weaponry from the

outside in case of a conflict needs to be avoided.

- There are approximately 35,000 tons of surplus ammunition in numerous poorly secured state-run weapons storage sites. 5,700 tons are unsafe at present and will be demilitarised; a large amount of the remaining ammunition will become unsafe in the next years. The disposal programme is conducted by UNDP BiH and MoD BiH within the framework of the UNDP Small Arms Control Project (SACBiH). The destruction capacities need to be increased and additional funding is required for the planned destruction projects and those ammunition and SALW destruction programmes which are to come. Additionally, it is important that adequate safety areas are positioned around all ammunition storage sites.
- BiH is still threatened by approximately 1.3 million landmines and UXOs, which are spread throughout the entire country. In order to be able to use the potential farmland and tourist areas, it is necessary to speed-up the demining process. Additional funding for this task in the next decades is required.
- An Assistance Programme for Redundant Military Personnel conducted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in close co-operation with the OSCE is purposed to support about 6,000 soldiers and MoD personnel. It must be ensured that no gap occurs in the funding for this three-year programme. The sustainability of structures, capacities and institutional memories also need to be taken care of. This programme should be connected with the foundation of an agency in charge of transforming military competences into civilian qualifications, the provision of additional training and

education for adequate civilian jobs for soldiers in the last phase of their military service. Furthermore, the development of programmes to deal with PTSD of all ex-combatants should be taken into consideration. These programmes could be part of a potential programme facing the collective trauma of war.

- The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is going to be replaced by the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) located in Sarajevo. The RCC is the new framework for regional co-operation and will bring together representatives of South Eastern Europe, including UNMIK/Kosovo, with the representatives of the international community. The RCC and the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) in Bestovje, Croatia, are examples for regional ownership. Both institutions and its initiatives should be supported by political and financial means and further co-operation.

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## Annex 1: Seminar Agenda

Expert Seminar

### **EU Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR): A Look at Bosnia and Herzegovina**

June 6, 2007

Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

#### PROGRAMME

- 10.00 hrs      Opening**
- **Eberhard Pohl**, Federal Foreign Office, Special Representative for Security Policy, Berlin
- 10.15 hrs      Session 1: DDR from a Conceptual Perspective – Between Post-Conflict Engagement and Long-Term Stability**
- Chair: **Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp**, Director IEP, Berlin
  - **Simon Yazgi**, Policy & Planning Officer (DDR), Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), New York
  - **Inger Buxton**, DG Relex, EU Commission, Brussels
  - **Dr. Hadewych Hazelzet**, Federal Foreign Office, ESDP-Division, Berlin
  - **Charlotte Watson**, Senior Programme Officer, international alert, Brussels
- 11.30 hrs      Coffee Break**

- 12.00 hrs      Session 2: DDR and Security in BiH: Lessons of the Past and Remaining Challenges**
- Chair: **Peter Croll**, Director, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Bonn
  - **OTL Emil Schreiber**, Federal Armed Forces Verification Center (ZVBw), Geilenkirchen
  - **Tobias Pietz**, Project Coordinator, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin
  - **Lena Andersson**, Defence Conversion Expert, RACVIAC, Zagreb
  - **Massimo Moratti**, International Center for Transitional Justice, Brussels
- 13.30 hrs      Buffet Lunch**
- 14.30 hrs      Session 3: EU Support for Security and Stability in BiH: Options and Policy Recommendations**
- Chair: **Karsten Diethelm Geier**, Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union, Brussels
  - **Boris Ruge**, Chief Advisor to the HR/EUSR BiH, Sarajevo
  - **Adrian Wilkinson**, Head of the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), Belgrade
  - **Col. Christophe Deherre**, Civ/Mil Cell, EU-Military Staff (EUMS), Brussels
  - **Christian Haupt**, Head of the Security Co-operation Department's Parliamentary Support Office, OSCE, Sarajevo
- 16.30 hrs      Conclusions**
- **Ulrich Brandenburg**, Deputy Policy Director, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
- 17.00 hrs      End of Conference / Reception**

## Annex II: Seminar Participants

NAME	Ministry / Institution
<b>Abou Karam-Bogoslaw, Jamilé</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany
<b>Ahammer, Thomas; OTL i.G. Mag.</b>	Military Representation of Austria to the EU, Brussels
<b>Altmann, Franz-Lothar; Dr.</b>	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
<b>Andersson, Lena</b>	RACVIAC, Zagreb
<b>Baktai, Erik</b>	MFA, Republic of Hungary, Department for Security Policy and Non-Proliferation
<b>Baledens, Didier</b>	MoD, France
<b>Balogh, Gábor; Cpt.</b>	Hungarian Defence Force, Peace Support Training Centre
<b>Berbic, Amna</b>	United Nations Development Programme / SEESAC, Belgrade
<b>Bleiker, Joachim</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Head of Division Western Balkans
<b>Bornefeld-Ettmann, Max; Olt</b>	Institute for European Politics (IEP), Berlin
<b>Brandenburg, Ulrich; MinDir.</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Deputy Political Director
<b>Buxton, Inger</b>	EU-Commission, External Relations Directorate General, Brussels
<b>Cigler, Mirko</b>	Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU, Brussels
<b>Conolly, Leo</b>	Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU, Brussels
<b>Croll, Peter</b>	Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany, Director

<b>Deherre, Christophe; Col.</b>	Civil-Military Cell / European Union Military Staff (EUMS) , Brussels
<b>Delacor, Marcus</b>	Institute for European Politics (IEP), Berlin
<b>Ehrhart, Hans-Georg; Dr.</b>	Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
<b>Falkowski, Norbert; OTL i.G.</b>	MoD, Germany (Fü S V 3), Bonn
<b>Flessenkemper, Tobias</b>	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Sarajevo
<b>Geier, Karsten Diethelm</b>	Political Military Group / Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU, Brussels
<b>Goulousi, Elena</b>	MFA, Greece
<b>Hasenau, Michael</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Deputy Head of Division Conventional Arms Control
<b>Haupt, Christian</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo
<b>Hazelzet, Hadewych; Dr.</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany; ESDP-Division
<b>Heger, Timo-Christian</b>	University of Potsdam, Germany
<b>Hinz, Stefan C.P.; OTL i.G.</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Assistant Head of ESDP-Division
<b>Jacobs, Lars; OTL i.G.</b>	MoD, Germany (Fü S III 4), Assistant Head of Division
<b>Jopp, Mathias; Prof. Dr.</b>	Institute for European Politics (IEP), Berlin, Director
<b>Kantola, Timo</b>	Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, Brussels
<b>Kapetanovic, Amer</b>	Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Berlin, Envoy
<b>Keijzer, Edwin</b>	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Berlin
<b>Klink, Eckart</b>	MoD, Germany (Fü S III 4), Head of Division
<b>Kordova, Eva</b>	Political Military Group / Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic Germany to the EU, Brussels



<b>Kujulinzic, Mitar</b>	Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Berlin, Ambassador
<b>Lalinde, Enrique Esquivel</b>	Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of Spain to the EU, Brussels
<b>Lepine, Pierre; M i.G. Dr.</b>	MoD, Germany
<b>Maes, Olivier</b>	Political Military Group / Deputy Representative of the Luxembourg Delegation to the PSC, Brussels
<b>Maxwell, Rohan</b>	NATO Headquarter Sarajevo
<b>Moratti, Massimo</b>	International Center for Transitional Justice, Brussels, Consultant
<b>Muir, Graham</b>	Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU, Brussels
<b>Neacsu, Milica</b>	Permanent Representation of Romania to the EU, Brussels
<b>Olexa, Michal</b>	Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic to the EU, Brussels
<b>Orlianges, Charles; LTC (GS)</b>	MoD, Germany (Fü S III 4), Desk Officer
<b>Pohl, Eberhard</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Special Representative for Security Policy
<b>Pietz, Tobias</b>	Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin
<b>Port, Thomas</b>	Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Germany (IK 11-12)
<b>Prummer, Karl</b>	MFA, Austria
<b>Reinhardt, Markus; OTL i.G.</b>	Political Military Group / Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU, Brussels
<b>Reljic, Dušan; Dr.</b>	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
<b>Ruge, Boris</b>	Chief Advisor to the High Representative / European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo
<b>Sandawi, Sammi</b>	Institute for European Politics (IEP), Berlin
<b>Saraiva, Luis</b>	Permanent Representation of Portugal to the EU, Brussels

<b>Schönfeld, Jobst; Oberst i.G.</b>	MoD, Germany (Fü S III 6), Head of Division
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<b>Simosas, Stefan</b>	European Commission / Directorate General Enlargement, Brussels
<b>Sisilica, Georgiana Olivia</b>	MFA, Romania
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<b>van Mulders, Karel</b>	Belgian Military Representation to the EU, Brussels
<b>van Winden, Michel</b>	MFA, Netherlands, Senior Policy Officer Western Balkans Division
<b>von Redecker, Niels; Dr.</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Political Advisor EUFOR, Sarajevo
<b>Watson, Charlotte</b>	International Alert, Brussels, Senior Programme Officer
<b>Weil, Christof, Dr.</b>	Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Head of ESDP-Division
<b>Wilkinson, Adrian</b>	SEESAC, Belgrade, Head
<b>Yazgi, Simon</b>	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York
<b>Zacharioglou, Michalis A.; Dr.</b>	Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus, Berlin
<b>Zetterlund, Kristina</b>	Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm
<b>Zupan, Natascha</b>	Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), Bonn



The Family Photo